

## Coalition Information Sharing: Lessons from the Balkans

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### ABSTRACT

Increased civil-military involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations around the world is matched in part by the rise in the number and complexity of these situations. There are many more actors on today's peace operations battlefield with competing as well as common interests and expectations. The need to improve coordination and more open information sharing is on the rise. Efforts to improve and facilitate more open information sharing among the disparate participants must overcome a continuing lack of trust among the civil-military actors and outdated organization cultural traditions and behavior patterns. All actors need to better understand each other and the roles they can and should play in an increasingly complex operational environment. In order to obtain closure and improve information sharing in the future, the actors must develop relationships based on mutual trust and there must be a clear understanding that information sharing operates on a two-way, transparent basis.

Since no two operations are really the same, one should be careful not to generalize too much on experiences and lessons learned. Each experience is different but lessons from previous operations can place the community on a higher level of awareness and facilitate the tailoring of actions to meet the needs of the new operation. The Balkans is certainly an example of this. Kosovo was not Bosnia for a number of reasons and therefore, although many things have been learned in the Bosnia operation not all lessons are directly applicable to the challenges of Kosovo. For example, despite extensive Bosnia civil-military experience, information sharing in the Kosovo operation was problematic. Although some progress has been made through local collaborative initiatives, there is still a ways to go to meet expectations. Experiences such as the Balkans are highlighting the urgency to improve and this coupled with the information technology revolution offers a means to an end.

### SETTING THE STAGE

The patterns of conflict for the post-Cold War environment are changing. The number of peace operations requiring civil-military intervention seems to be increasing not only in frequency but also in complexity and number of situations causing human suffering. The “traditional peace operation environment” where combatants signed an agreement in good faith and asked a world body like the United Nations (UN) to serve as a neutral observer appear to be a thing of the past. The Balkans experience could lead one to believe that there is reason to doubt the true intentions of parties to a peace agreement in today’s environment. It is no longer clear whether the parties have signed up to work together to achieve a peaceful settlement or whether they are using this as a way to regroup and buy time to be able to pursue their goals by other means including violence. New actors and expectations are challenging the traditional institutions. Whereas earlier peace operations were primarily military with possibly a small police contingent, more recent operations have involved larger police contingents, relief and reconstruction teams, election supervision personnel, and multi-national administration staffs. Instead of monitoring a cease-fire line, the intervention force is likely to have a much broader mandate. Actions are likely to include disarming belligerents and cantonment or destruction of their weapons, arresting suspected war criminals, distribution and protection of humanitarian aid, civil infrastructure reconstruction, nation building, and assisting and protecting the resettlement of displaced persons. The Balkans has experienced these as well as others. As a result, the need for a more integrated and cooperative civil-military involvement is on the rise in an operational environment that is becoming increasingly more difficult and dangerous for the peacekeepers.

Many conflicts are now driven by the weakness of states rather than their strengths. Wars no longer take place between states that feel strong enough to conquer another but rather within states that have become so weak they implode. “Wars of the Amateurs” occur where the state breaks down and the population regroups into identifiable factions. Disintegration of public law enforcement, the military and other security forces occur as well. The armed amateurs use the full range of conventional weapons for unconventional operations such as “scorched earth” actions, “ethnic cleansing,” and terrorism and intimidation. Political groupings led by charismatic leaders play on minority fears and ancient grievances. There are no clear front lines and rear areas but instead fluid “zones of conflict.” Furthermore, today’s peace operation battlefield is populated by a large number of actors with their own agendas and there are those who will not be held accountable for their action. There are wide

extremes of weather and terrain, a mix of urban and rural, modern and primitive, upscale and slum and most likely inadequate transportation routes and massive problems arising from displaced persons and destroyed infrastructure. Such was the case for the Balkans.

Post-conflict reconstruction and nation building have changed as well. The financial commitments of donors and nations are problematic. Clear political objectives and end states for intervention and successful resolution of a conflict rarely exist. For example, a year after the UN-led Kosovo intervention (supported by the OSCE, EU and NATO) financial assistance offers made at the outset by international financial institutions and nations have yet to fully materialize and there is still no internationally agreed Kosovo strategy and plan to guide efforts. There was no civil administration and law enforcement infrastructure when UNMIK and KFOR deployed it was essentially a “Wild West” environment and to some extent still is a year later. The power, water, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure was problematic and is only slightly better. There was and still is little desire on the part of the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs to work together to rebuild the country.

Understanding the relationships and motivators of the actors on the peace operations battlefield requires an understanding of the complex dynamics at work. The emerging need for stronger civil-military relationships and cooperation are influenced not only by the political context and conditions of the operations but also by the shared moments of the participants on the ground. The decision to intervene in a conflict is political and the military mission in support of the intervention reflects the political process. Military support to such operations is just that, a military operation. The military are there to create a safe and secure environment and provide assistance, as appropriate and necessary, to the International Organizations (IO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). They are not there to do the jobs of these organizations. Credible coercion prevents would-be instigators from disrupting the humanitarian effort. The military presence also helps affect the daily and political life of the country and represents a chance for change and can raise expectations of the afflicted people. There is a down side risk that such presence may delay stabilization or create tensions once the situation is stabilized. These adverse consequences need to be carefully managed by the senior civil-military leadership on the ground and factored into actions taken by headquarters operations supporting them.

The process of establishing security and restoring a tenuous stability in order to address humanitarian needs is therefore inherently political. Humanitarian intervention may not be a bloodless exercise however. Labeling efforts as “peace” operations can create false expectations through improper generalized assumptions and perceptions that a lower threshold of violence implies a casualty-free operation. The on the ground risks of such operations must be envisioned and acknowledged by senior political leadership not only when assessing the need for the use of credible coercion but also when and after the forces are deployed. The associated risks need to be clearly articulated to the population from the outset and continue through out the operation, especially since the public interest in peace operations is rather short lived.

For extended operations, such as the Balkans, the tolerance for casualties will likely become less as time passes and complacency sets in and therefore, the risks become less obvious to the public in general. If the public is not kept adequately informed through out the intervention period and do not openly support the operation, then the deployed forces can become a target — possible means of forcing a national policy change. The public does not like nor do the react well to surprises, especially if it is loss of life of a soldier in a peace

operation. Withdraw of US forces from Somalia is an example of a political response to a public reaction and may have shaped the US military force protection policy for some time to come.

A common complaint about the US military support in the Balkans is that security is an end in itself rather than an enabler to the broader humanitarian goal. Certainly no military commander does not think his first priority is to bring his troops home safely while recognizing that some may not. However, if casualties are politically intolerable then the desire to bring one's troops home safely can be amplified to the point of distortion. In this case, the military will rightly and instinctively begin to serve its own end and force protection of the protective forces will become the paramount concern. One might argue that this is the case in the Balkans for US forces. Kevlar helmets, flack vests, carrying of loaded weapons and use of multiple vehicle convoys for movement around the US sectors in Bosnia and Kosovo are still the norm whereas this is not generally the case for the other sectors and the rest of the international military and NATO headquarters elements supporting operations in the Balkans. During Operation Allied Force, allied air operations were conducted above 30,000 feet to keep aircraft, pilots and crew out of harms way.

Contrary to popular belief, "aid" is political and may not always be the right answer for a given situation and in some instances can even exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, especially if not coordinated and managed properly. For example, food can become the currency of political power. As a result, control and distribution can become an arena of "local power politics." Uncoordinated and competing humanitarian assistance efforts serve to exacerbate the problem and can include well-intentioned but not properly synchronized military and IO and NGO actions. Despite their traditional apolitical stance, NGOs are political as well. They have their own prestige, agenda and turf. In fact, all actors on the peace operation battlefield, including participating nations civil and military elements and the IOs such as the UN, OSCE, EU, NATO, and others, have their own self-interests. The challenge is leveraging these interests for the good of the whole.

Most but not all of these organizations are accountable for the consequences of their actions. Like it or not, the civil-military leaders in the field through their actions create and establish policy whether there is a clear political strategy or not. The NGOs on the other hand are more varied in interests, tend to be less structured and operate autonomously and in many cases are less likely to be held fully accountable for their actions. There were lots of "Good Samaritans" trying to help and coordinating these efforts, some times referred to as "Herding Cats," was a monumental task. In Bosnia there were more than 500 NGOs already in country when NATO and elements of other IOs such as the Office of the High Representative deployed. At the outset of the Kosovo operation there were some 300 NGOs in addition to KFOR troops and UN and other IO personnel. For Kosovo, all of this took place in the area about the size of Connecticut. Therefore, the civil-military actors, including the NGOs, must develop a better collective awareness, appreciation and understanding of the political aspects and ramifications of the peace operation environment and the relative impacts of the actions of those who participate.

No matter how complex the situation, there always seems to be a common understanding of the nature of the situation among the actors on the ground. The challenge is translating from a common understanding to a shared vision and strategy and plans that make sense to implement. One should not over look the fact, however, that no two situations are ever really the same and that it takes time to determine the needs of the new situation, understand

the dynamics that expedite or impede actions, and understand the comparative advantages of the participants. It is also necessary to figure out how the different organizations fit together in the grand scheme of things and ideally, these actions should be completed before the operation begins but this is rarely, if ever, the case. In stead, it is more a “happening” as the operation evolves. Further complicating the situation is that the military is frustrated with the ambiguous political end state and process (political end states and processes always will be fuzzy) and the civilian side see the military as too rigid. Both are suspicious of each other’s true intentions. The facts of the situation are that the civilian side brings humanitarian expertise, a familiarity with the affected area, and sustained commitment. The military bring to the table an infrastructure that provides communications, logistics and security. Both need each other and in the end, the civilian side provides the military their ticket home.

There are pressures to put the military in the dominant role at the outset of peace operations or at least until a credible civilian organization can be established in country. If the military are put in this position, then they will either leave too soon or stay too long. They will also be lured into taking on actions that the civilian agencies should do because they have the infrastructure in place that can be used to do these things. In Bosnia, establishment of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other IOs elements in country were significantly behind the NATO military force deployment and the OHR was not given the overall authority that was required to direct and synthesize multiple civil and military actions. The OHR was not a UN Special Representative with UN authority and the UN was reluctant to play a lead role. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) did not report to the OHR. There was no internationally recognized political organization providing overall direction and this hampered synchronization of civil-military activities. As a consequence, actors operated autonomously within a loose framework of cooperation, but without a formal structure for developing unified policy.

In Kosovo, UNMIK tried to do better with the establishment of a four-pillar structure (UNHCR, UN Civil Administration, OSCE, EU) under its leadership but this was a first-ever civil administration operation for them and there were no procedures to guide their actions. KFOR was used to support the four-pillar structure by providing a safe and secure environment. Although KFOR proved not to be a paper tiger and the UNMIK approached showed good potential, there was a lack of a clear international vision and agreed strategy and plan for Kosovo and in some cases there was even a lack of UNMIK authority for directing and synchronizing activities of the civil-military actors and this added frustrations to achieving progress. Further complicating things was the fact that the NATO-led Kosovo Force had its own reporting chain and COMKFOR was not the UN Force Commander. Despite these frustrations and coordination challenges, the collaborative effort of UNMIK and KFOR’s resulted in some progress being made but achieving a stable civil administration in Kosovo remains a significant challenge.

For both Bosnia and Kosovo operations, the military had to fill gaps where there was an absence of credible civil agencies to act and this raised expectations for continued military support for these actions (some times referred to as “mission-creep”) and in some cases slowed the creation of the necessary civilian capabilities to meet the infrastructure reconstruction and nation-building needs. The military role needs to be one of a means to a declared political end state and in support of civilian efforts. If this is the case, then the civilians will remain responsible for the overall strategy and accountable for the end-state that results.

Unfortunately, the more complex the situation the less likely it is a shared vision and common strategy will emerge and the implications for not achieving success are enormous. One might conclude that this is the situation for Kosovo and that it is unlikely nations will take the risks and employ the resources necessary to rebuild. In this case, decisions of “on-the-ground” leaders will carry a lot of weight and they will collectively be creating policy. Therefore, they must be empowered by their respective headquarters and nations to act with wide latitude. Building on their presence and understanding offers the possibility to develop at least a de facto overarching shared vision. Regrettably, in the Balkans the rotation policies of the military, IOs and NGOs add uncertainty to success. For example, the KFOR commanders and staff turnover about every six months including the MNBs and multinational units assigned to them. There is pending sizable turnover of some of the non-military organizations such as UNMIK Police and Civil Administration staff. These changes introduce continuity and coordination problems and loss of institutional knowledge that adds unneeded challenges to achieving and sustaining a stable operation. In Kosovo, UNMIK is also suffering from an unusually high turnover of staff and lack of available skilled staff to fill key vacancies. The military exit strategy in the Balkans is directly tied to the success of organizations such as UNMIK in Kosovo. Actions in the Balkans suggest the military and international organizations may be there for some time to come.

All parties need to work hard at coordination because complete agreement will never be achieved. Old mindsets of the players need to be discarded. A linear military mindset is insufficient and NGOs in particular, need to break with traditions of organizational autonomy and liberating perspectives that promote a behavior of do what they want when and where they want. NGOs compete for funding and therefore seek visibility for their donors. Their actions can be closely tied to media coverage of a particular operation and ultimately their participation and continued presence — it should not come as a surprise that some follow the money trail. Many do not and are focused on providing grass-roots primary relief and are in it for the long haul. NGOs are usually on the ground before the military and many of the IOs arrive, remain during their presence, and stay after they leave. IOs like the UN need to discard old bureaucratic politics and corporate cultures of turf guarding and lingering perceptions of anti-military feelings and behavior and fears that power, security, and prestige will be sacrificed if they need to compromise. The future has to be an integrated response of all the players for the good of the overall effort and this will require some tough institutional culture and organization behavior changes. Although full cooperation is the goal, one needs to manage expectations and in the end some limited partnerships may be the best one can achieve for some time to come, especially with the NGO community who do not operate within either the military or governmental hierarchies.

Luckily, on the ground many of the higher echelon institutional problems have less impact since the emphasis is about problem solving, making things happen, and people. Many of the participants view peace and humanitarian assistance operations not as a profession but as a calling. These operations place tremendous physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual demands on the participants. Individuals who have participated in such operations frequently recall how meaningful their participation was and that in spite of their political orientations and organizational perspectives, insular visions, and protected core values they, as individuals, were “in it together.” The civilian and military staffs are dedicated, selfless, professional people who work sixteen-hour days, frequently with no showers, under extreme conditions, and a decision-making process that carries life-and-death consequences. For the military, decisions and actions at the tactical level can and do have

immediate strategic and national political implications — the emergence of the “strategic corporal.” These are endeavors that one eats drinks and sleep and can have tremendous wear-and-tear on body and soul. They are not “touch-feely” endeavors and as in war, friction is ever present.

There are cases where other coalition military actions, such as air and naval operations, may need to be taken in support of a civil-military ground intervention. The NATO-led Operation Allied Force air war over Serbia set the stage for the UNMIK and Kosovo force (KFOR) intervention. These types of military operations are highly structured and use the latest information technologies to meet the situation awareness and command and control needs. Because of this, information superiority allowed NATO to know almost everything about the battlefield and this provided a more complete intelligence picture that assisted the targeting, advanced weapon system platforms and precision-guided munitions to locate and destroy targets. Not all of the high-tech systems functioned all of the time with perfection. For example, some were unable to operate under poor weather conditions and this tended to be the case during the early phases of the air operations. Like ground operations, the human element continued to be an important factor. Planners and users of information were not always adequately prepared. NATO analysts did not always understand everything they thought they knew. In spite of NATO’s near total information superiority, its battle space awareness was manipulated by the Serb armed forces more often than expected. There were coalition information sharing problems associated with situation awareness and dissemination of the air tasking order. In some cases, too much information created information overload for commanders and their staffs. Serb military interception of some NATO “in the clear” communications and allegations of internal leaks of NATO sensitive military operations information raised concerns about coalition information assurance and trust relationships and the ability to protect time sensitive military operation information.

International organizations who operate on the basis of transparency, impartiality, and the rule of law now find that with expanded responsibilities in peace operations such as election monitoring, arms control verification, and law enforcement there is a need for more active intelligence collection by them as well. The UN is more frequently finding itself in vulnerable positions where conflicting parties are taking advantage of their naiveté, knowledge gaps, and other weaknesses. This creates a complex dilemma for them, i.e., trying to live up to high ethical standards while attempting to determine the degree of secrecy to employ in a peace operation. It is also a particular difficult problem since the UN unlike nations and their militaries or NATO, where tried and proven procedures exist, is just trying to get its act together. As a result of early experiences in Bosnia, where UN messages “in the clear” were being intercepted and exploited by the Serbs, the UN now has a secure communications capability deployed in Kosovo. In addition to selectively employing secure communications and information systems, the UN also needs to establish capabilities, processes and procedures to deal with collection, classification/declassification, storage, and dissemination of sensitive information in a systematic fashion. Compatibility with NATO and national capabilities to facilitate sensitive information sharing and secure interoperability are yet to be determined.

## **SOME INFORMATION SHARING CHALLENGES**

Coalition information sharing is a multi-dimensional problem space. There are policy and doctrine considerations. As noted earlier, Balkans policy, vision and strategy to guide civil and military intervention planning activities was vague. Internationally agreed policy and doctrine for conducting peace operations are evolving. KFOR deployed to impose order and prevent ethnic violence but soon found out there were in a policing operation requiring them to deal with organized crime and law enforcement activities initially and now in cooperation with the UNMIK-Police. Policing is a civil function but there was no civil judicial, civil policing or civil administration or equivalent UN or other IO provided capability at the outset of the operation. As a result, the military found themselves in the position of not only being the policeman and judge but also the mayor, fire chief and any other civil position necessary to establish order and return of stability.

Information sharing for military use and for law enforcement purposes is different and police operations require professionals trained in related tactics, techniques, and crime scene procedures and these differ from military war fighting training and capabilities. In Bosnia, the political decision process was slow and NATO and national guidance was kept close-hold. As a result, planning was disjoint and there was inadequate sharing of intelligence and force deployment information at the outset. In both the Bosnia and Kosovo cases, the NATO command structure had difficulties operating in a political and civil vacuum and there was limited military pre-coordination planning with IO and NGO elements. There was also a lack of representation from these organizations.

The NATO Balkans operations (IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR) required the establishment of special security categories, release procedures and dissemination networks. National releasable was not necessarily NATO releasable and NATO releasable information was not automatically IFOR, SFOR or KFOR releasable. In Bosnia there were separate data networks to disseminate national information, e.g., SIPRNET for the U.S. elements. NATO established a NATO SECRET WAN for allied member access, LOCE for IFOR/SFOR releasable Intelligence dissemination and the IFOR/SFOR SECRET WAN (CRONOS) for Ops-Intel to headquarters and multinational division headquarters. A separate data network was established for disseminating sensitive information to Non-NATO troop committing nations. In Kosovo, once again there were separate National networks, a NATO SECRET WAN, a KFOR SECRET WAN, and a KFOR UNCLASSIFIED WAN (INTERNET). LOCE supported KFOR as well. Operation Allied Force used CRONOS and LOCE to disseminate the NATO common operational picture and the NATO air tasking order.

Information sharing is not a natural proclivity for many organizations and actors involved in coalition operations. Military and intelligence organizations are not accustomed to sharing data with international and NGO organizations and vice versa. For operational security reasons, there is a continuing reluctance on the part of the military to share time sensitive operational information with anyone other than military. Fears that data will be misused or that databases contain inaccuracies also militate against open information sharing. Even for military to military sharing, not all nations in a military coalition are treated as equals and many partners in today's operations were former enemies in the cold war so there are differing "need to know" restrictions placed on sharing sensitive military related information with them.

NGOs and the media are concerned about maintaining the perception of neutrality and are therefore hesitant to work too closely with the military or be perceived as pawns of the military intelligence organizations in particular. In addition they do not always share the

same objectives and are suspicious of government intentions. NGOs need certain information from the military, such as, weather, threat information, military movements, and possible availability of military transportation services, in order to carry out their humanitarian support activities. The media's job is to tell the story as they see it and are a conglomerate of competing organizations with their own agenda's.

The media is neither a partner nor opponent but what they cover and how they cover it affects both policy-makers and military commanders. Frequently journalist and reporters find themselves in harms way when trying to get the story and some make the ultimate sacrifice to get the truth out. There appears to be a growing concern that today's media may be focusing too much on getting "the sensational stories" that sell magazines, newspapers and airtime on radio and TV than on a balanced mix that includes other equally important stories. As a result, one might question whether the media industry profit motives are more the driver today than the old fashion "Ernie Pyle" journalism and getting to the real story. The media are everywhere and report live events around the world and in some case before the commander on the ground is aware. The military are sensitivity to the "CNN effect" of instant worldwide reporting and its potential adverse impact on ongoing operations. Sometimes media reports are unsubstantiated and the military must react to clarify the situation diverting scarce resources that need to be used elsewhere. On the other hand, the media are highly sensitive to military attempts to overly control their activities and react negatively to government use of "spin doctors."

The military public affairs officers are just as sensitive as the media to losing impartiality. They are the "honest broker" spokesperson for the military. A lesson repeatedly learned from most operations is that media coverage matters and that the role of military public affairs should not be under estimated. The delicate balance between operational security and informing continues to drive the military to be much more cautious and selective in sharing information with NGOs, media and other non-military organizations. The Balkans has been a good learning experience and progress is being made to improve information sharing with the media and NGOs. For example, a media operations center was established at NATO headquarters during the air operation to facilitate national coordination and improve the NATO public information office access to military information. The UN, OSCE, NATO, and the lead national military elements have established information centers throughout Kosovo that offer free and open access for NGOs, the public, and other interested parties.

There are cultural and language differences that affect information sharing. The military approach is "plan we must" and are highly structured, disciplined and focused. They place a wide footprint on the ground with overwhelming capability and attempt to define a clear end state (most times hard to do because of the fuzzy political process) with an objective to get out as soon as possible. On the other hand, for the IOs and NGOs it's more like "plan if we can." They lack structure, discipline, and have limited focus. Their footprint is very limited as well as capabilities and their end state is less well defined with many of them remaining in country long after the military leave.

Language continues to be a major problem for the military. Operations tend to occur in areas where the military language training programs do not provide an adequate supply of qualified linguists for the area of operation. In the Balkans the interpreters were a mix of US citizens and local hires. Many of the US citizens had clearances and were used for sensitive military operations such as being attached to Special Forces teams. Although the military intent was to win the hearts and minds, combatants often used fear and intimidation to inhibit

or discourage local inhabitants to openly work with and share information with the coalition forces. Interpreters sometimes explained rather than translated or added their own spin and therefore required careful monitoring of their actions. Many soldiers found it more useful to try to speak to locals in German or Italian rather than Serbian or Albanian or use an interpreter. Most of the interpreters were local hires through an Army contract with TRW. There was also a large use of local hires through a Brown and Root contract that were employed to support Camp Bondsteel and Camp Monteith day-to-day operations, e.g., laborers, dining facility, PX, and laundry and cleaning services. The use of local hires has a down side risk in that it presents an operations security challenge that needs to be carefully monitored and managed.

Information sharing among organizations also has personality, education, training and experience aspects that influence the degree of cooperation and sharing that may be achievable in an operational environment. Picking key leaders that promote and demonstrate open collaboration, cooperation and sharing has a major positive impact on how well the rest of the organizations function together. The value of more open sharing and cooperation needs to be an integral part of the education and training of the participants. The use of joint planning and training before deployment also has a major positive impact on operationalizing civil-military cooperation and information sharing when intervention takes place. NATO and US forces are employing pre-deployment exercises to prepare replacement forces and the US military uses “right seat” training to facilitate transfer of responsibilities on the ground.

### **AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS PAVE THE WAY**

The civil-military community continues to try to understand how modern information technology can be employed to synchronize activities in support of peace operations and facilitate more open information sharing. Agility and accommodation continue to be keys to success as well as some plain old good luck. Operational success continues to rely heavily on the professionalism, dedication, and ingenuity of the men and women who were there and those who supported them. Ad hoc arrangements helped pave the way to resolving many of the collaboration, coordination and information sharing challenges.

A “cottage industry” of liaisons emerged in Bosnia and continued to a lesser extent in Kosovo. There were liaisons between IFOR/SFOR and the Multinational Divisions (MND), between the MND headquarters, between the MND lead nations and non-NATO military units assigned to them, between IFOR/SFOR/MNDs and international organizations such as the OHR, UN and OSCE, and between the IOs and NATO and the NGOs and with Bosnian civil agencies such as the water, power and telecommunications utilities. In Kosovo, liaisons were most dominant between the MNBs and KFOR and between MNB lead nations and military elements assigned to them. There were no liaisons between the MNB headquarters. The MNB civil affairs elements played a major role interfacing with non-military organizations such as UNMIK, OSCE, NGOs and local organizations. Military liaisons were established by some of the larger NGOs to help improve the overall situation.

In the US sector, MNB-E, US Civil Affairs teams were collocated with the UNMIK regional office in Gnjilane and municipal offices in major cities such as Vitina, Kamenica, Strpce, and Kacanik. The US MPs were collocated with UNMIK-Police at UN established municipal police headquarters. Italian Carabinieri of the Multinational Specialized Units that

reported to COMKFOR also had units assigned to each of the MNBs. There were also liaisons at other command and organization levels such as at SHAPE headquarters and the Partnership for Peace nations and Russian liaison elements, the Combined Air Operations Center and its national military air liaison elements, NATO liaisons with EUROCONTROL and national Civil Air Traffic Control organizations during the air war, and the NATO Media Operations Center and its national civilian and NATO military representatives. These are examples of some of the liaison activities that highlight the importance of the roles they play in bridging language, cultural, doctrine, procedures, and communications gaps and also serve to facilitate information sharing in a multinational operational environment.

Strong leadership is a facilitator to achieving more open information sharing. "Trust" is a fundamental source of tension in coalition operations. Selecting senior leaders who can build and sustain trust relationships (trust relationships are earned and can be easily broken) and work together for the common cause is an important consideration in building the team. In reality, however, this does not seem to be a major factor when selecting leaders for peace operations. More often than not, it seems to be "a luck of the draw" for the coalition peace operation team. At the outset of the Bosnia operation, the senior level civil-military relationships were not as strong as those established in Kosovo where the Senior Representative of the UN Secretary General and Commander KFOR work very closely together and met daily. Their staffs also work together very closely and included the collocation of some KFOR CIMIC staff at UNMIK headquarters in Pristina.

There were formal and many ad hoc joint working groups, joint commissions, and other joint activities formed to facilitate collaboration, coordination and information sharing in the Balkans. In Bosnia there was the Joint Civil Commission and the Joint Military Commission that were used to synchronize civil-military activities and to deal with the faction military leadership and their adherence to the terms of the Military Annex to the Dayton Agreement. In Kosovo there was the Joint Interim Administrative Structure and the Joint Implementation Commission. The former dealt with civil administration and the latter ensured compliance with the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement. The JIC was also used to oversee activities of the Kosovo Protection Corps. There was an MNB-E chaired Joint Security Committee that dealt with regional and municipal security matters. The MNB-E JSC met weekly at the UNMIK municipal offices. These meetings provided an opportunity for the military, UNMIK and NGO representatives to discuss activities and issues and assign actions for resolution. In MNB-E sector there was also a weekly UNMIK four-pillar meeting held at the UNMIK regional office in Gnjilane for which Task Force Falcon represented KFOR.

The UN, OSCE, and KFOR and its MNBs set up information centers that were located in the major cities and provide free and open access to all who want to use the facilities. In Pristina there was the Humanitarian Community Information Center that was supported by UN elements as well as other organizations and it encouraged and enabled the exchange of information among the wide range of actors working in Kosovo. KFOR CIMIC used the HCIC facilities as its de facto CIMIC Center. The OSCE established information centers in major cities to facilitate coordination with local NGOs. The MNBs established information centers either collocated in municipal UNMIK facilities or in facilities they took over for this purpose. These centers were located within the cities as storefront operations.

The Intelligence community employed National Intelligence Cells to facilitate collaboration and coordination at headquarters levels and lead nations used intelligence support teams to facilitate exchange of information with military units assigned to their area

of responsibility. For example, in MNB-E the US intelligence support team with the Russian brigade not only translated KFOR intelligence into Russian but also translated news stories from the Internet that related to Chechnya and provided these to them as well. The Russians did not have good access to news and the units in Kosovo were from the Chechnya operation and would be returning to this operation at the completion of their Kosovo assignment. The Combined Air Operations Center created an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Cell to coordinate collection management in support of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR and Operation Allied Force requirements. For Bosnia, there was an Intelligence Coordination Cell established and staffed by multinational representatives at the US Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England. The ICC supported field requests for information and the integration of multinational intelligence inputs and the dissemination of processed intelligence to IFOR/SFOR elements. It was a de facto intelligence help desk where nationals in the field, whose English speaking skills were limited, could ask national counter parts at the ICC for information using their native language.

Interpreting requests for information at high level centers, such as the ICC and national rear area centers, may not only have a language component but can also have an understanding or appreciation component since perspectives differ as one moves up the command levels and get further away from the actions on the ground. The US employed National Intelligence Support Teams at its NICs as a way to bridge the rear area capabilities with the commander on the ground and to help interpret the information requests for processing at the rear area centers. Intelligence analysts were also frequently sent to the field to provide them on the ground understanding to help bridge potential gaps as well. These approaches served to improve the overall understanding and responsiveness of the intelligence community to on the ground commander needs. Open source information publications such as Pentagon “Early Bird” equivalents were produced daily in the US sectors as well. In Bosnia it was the “Night Owl” and in Kosovo the “Daily Falcon.” In Kosovo, the OSCE monitored the local media activities and reported daily on the content of the Serb and Albania radio and TV network broadcasts and print media articles and reported violations of UN media policy directives. A weekly summary report was provided as well.

Public Affairs created Joint Information Bureau’s and employed Joint Information Coordinating Committees to focus efforts and collaborate and share information among public affairs elements. There were joint coordination working groups established by Civil Affairs (in NATO terms Civil Military Cooperation or CIMIC), PSYOP, and Information Operations to foster collaboration, coordination, and sharing of information between these multinational elements. These working groups also served to help de-conflict activities and leverage the overall efforts. In most cases, NGOs were invited to participate but rarely did except for the CA/CIMIC working groups. There were a number of UNMIK and HCIC initiatives to create a voluntary information group composed of consumers and providers of information, broaden the HCIC information databases and sharing role, select a GIS software standard (MapInfo was used by a number of organizations), and establish an UNMIK Chief Information Officer. Many other ad hoc activities came and went as dictated by operations on the ground.

As was the case in Bosnia, communications and information system interoperability and sharing of information between NATO, national militaries, IOs, and the NGOs in Kosovo was problematic as well. When information sharing did take place, “sneaker nets” tended to be the mode of choice. Multiple stove-piped systems and duplication of effort proliferated the Kosovo battlefield. The root cause of this situation was not technical but largely a

“political will” issue coupled with some continuing distrust between military and non-military organizations and outdated “restrictive NATO and national policies” on the sharing of so-called military information. The unwillingness to provide some limited guard gateway interconnection for the respective data networks exacerbated the situation. Another complicating factor was that although many lessons were learned in Bosnia, Kosovo was and still is not Bosnia. The Kosovo public telecommunications services (PTK) were problematic before the air war and Operation Allied Force solved this problem by surgically neutralizing any functioning capabilities that may have existed. This becomes visibly obvious in downtown Pristina where one can see the effects of a Cruise Missile attack that destroyed the telecommunications center across the street from the facilities now being used for UNMIK headquarters.

The UN, KFOR and military voice networks were not interconnected to the degree they were in Bosnia. In many cases, it became necessary to meet face to face in order to communicate and exchange information. Civil radio and TV stations were destroyed as well and the print media was reduced to Albania only products. Further complicating the situation was the fact that a large portion of the educated and technically skilled Kosovo work force were Serbs and they fled when the bombing started and KFOR occupied Kosovo and after a year, they still have not returned. Commercial enterprises such as Radio Shack or CompUSA equivalents were and still are non-existent in Kosovo. After a year, commercial radio, TV and print media are on the rise but for the Serb community there is yet to be a daily newspaper produced in Kosovo. Serb language papers come from Serbia. Remote villages lack access to media outlets. Although progress has been made over the last year, much still needs to be done and Kosovo remains a telecommunications and information poor environment.

The UN extended its commercially based global communication and information system into Kosovo to provide voice and information network (including email and Internet access) services to all of its deployed elements. The UNMIK network was a mixture of leased services and UN provided services. NATO contracted a commercial turnkey service for its KFOR voice and data network services. There was also a military tactical network overlay to support essential KFOR command and control needs. These services supported KFOR headquarters and extended connectivity and access to its Multinational Brigade headquarters as well as KFOR Support and NATO Headquarters elements. Each of the five Multinational Brigades deployed a mix of military tactical and commercial capabilities. For the sustained operations phase, the US Army deployed its “Dragon” package that is a commercially based contractor maintained and operated capability. The “Dragon” package supported the communications and information needs of Camp Bondsteel and Camp Montieth, the major US support bases in Kosovo and Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia.

Tactical systems were used to support deployed units and essential MNB-E headquarters command and control needs. Leased Commercial SATCOM was the major long haul provider of connectivity for military and non-military systems deployed in Kosovo. Commercial satellite phones such as INMARSAT continued to be used for contingency operations but commercial cellular phones (European GSM based system) emerged as the means of choice for communicating in Kosovo, especially for the non-US forces. Internet became a major player for informing and facilitating information sharing among the various parties. Extensive use was made of Internet web sites for open information sharing and informing. Email provided an alternative communications means to public telecommunications and served to facilitate information sharing across traditional military

and non-military boundaries. A non-profit organization established an Internet Service Provider in Pristina and several of the larger cities that offered Internet services to organizations such as the UN, OSCE, and a number of the larger NGOs. They also supported "Internet cafes" for more general public use as well. There were, however, some down side risks associated with the use of Internet such as the "ILOVEYOU" virus that temporarily disabled some NATO and national military data network capabilities in Kosovo.

There were new creative uses of commercial products that emerged in Kosovo. In the US sector, the Motorola "TalkAbout" recreational Two-Way radio was used extensively for dismounted, convoy, and base area communications purposes. It became a de facto status symbol and nearly everyone had one clipped to his or her flack vest. There were also other types of commercially available hand held radios that were used by the NGOs, UNMIK, and KFOR personnel. Use of these unprotected radios introduced military OPSEC risks that needed to be carefully managed. A surprise entry was the extensive use of the 3Com "Palm Pilot" for note taking and exchanging information. It was not unusual to see US military staff officers scratch notes on their Palm Pilot during a meeting and then use the infrared link to exchange notes or send a tasking. Commercial remote sensing and Geographic Information Systems were used by the military for improved mission planning and by the non-military for Humanitarian Assistance and nation building planning and assessment activities, such as, refugee returns, reconstruction and mine location and clearing actions.

A wide variety of commercial products and services now offer so called military-unique like features including rapid, globally deployable self-sustaining communication capabilities and voice and data network encryption. NATO and its Allied militaries are moving towards more extensive use of a mix of commercial and military systems and commercial is becoming a dominate player in providing communications and information systems support for peace operations. Adding emphasis to this trend is the fact that the number of simultaneous peace support operations being conducted around the world by the military is on the rise and coupling this with today's military insatiable appetite for information, the bandwidth needs far exceed that which the current military tactical systems can effectively support for globally deployed forces. Hence, commercial products and services have become a necessary and viable alternative to meet real world operational needs. Experiences and lessons from ongoing peace support operations should lead to a further break down of barriers to information sharing and ultimately to a willingness to consider selective interconnection of military and non-military systems to meet peace support operations needs. Commercial is a means to achieving this end.

## **THE WAY AHEAD**

Civil-military unity of effort has been an essential yet frustrating elusive requirement for success in post-Cold War peace operations. Information sharing among civilian and military entities is on the rise and deemed an essential requirement for success. The assumption is that information sharing can enhance operational efficiencies thereby avoiding wasteful duplication of effort and avoiding conflicting advice and implementing contradictory programs and competing actions. Two types of information have emerged as essential for such operations and they are current information on the situation on the ground and accurate maps. In Kosovo, attempts are being made to improve shared situation awareness though the use of civil and military provided information centers. As noted earlier, an excellent example

of such a center is the Humanitarian Community Information Center in Pristina that is run by civilians and available for any ones use be they NGO, local nationals regardless of ethnic origin, military or IOs. Availability of accurate maps has been and continues to be a serious deficiency and this was the case for both Bosnia and Kosovo. The US National Imagery and Mapping Agency has made significant progress in making maps electronically available to the US military. A broader sharing of this capability among coalition partners and use by non-military elements such as the UNMIK-Police are being worked.

In reality, inefficiencies are inherent in any multilateral activity and competing interests and fears of loss of power and prestige will make unity of effort a desired objective that will be difficult to achieve. Furthermore, information can be power and an effective means to an end but only if it can be interpreted, shared, and used effectively be it for military, political or civil use. Information can also help reduce uncertainty and provides those that possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process. There continues to be a general lack of trust among the players and a lack of a shared understanding of the value-added through more open and improved information sharing. Information sharing among the actors on the peace operations battlefield continues to be largely a manual process. These obstacles need to be recognized and to the extent possible practical recommendations developed for ameliorating them.

Today's information and communications technologies can serve to facilitate exchange among the players and integration of social, economic, political, geographic, weather, military activities, threat information, refugee return, reconstruction, human rights violations, criminal activities, and other relevant information and its timely dissemination to the interested parties. In the end, however, it comes down to the human element and the ability to find, interpret and use information effectively and the willingness to trust each other, openly share information, and work together for the good of a common cause.

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